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FOREWORD

The common denominator intent of any terrorist group
is to impose self-determined desires for “change” on a
society, a nation-state, and/or other perceived symbols of
power in the global community. The solution to the
terrorism threat is not simply to destroy small bands of
terrorist fanatics and the governments that support them.
Additional measures are needed. That is, once a terrorist
group is brought under control or neutralized, multifaceted
efforts must be taken to preclude the seeds that created that
organization from germinating again. Given these realities
within the context of the contemporary global security
environment, the United States has little choice but to
reexamine and rethink national and global stability and
security—and a peaceful and more prosperous tomorrow.
In these terms, the author, Dr. Max Manwaring, seeks to
do several things. He outlines the violent characteristics of
the new security-stability environment and briefly
examines the problem of terrorism and the related problem
of governance. Then he analyzes the complex threat and
response situation and outlines a multidimensional
response to these problems. Finally, he enumerates some
civil-military implications for playing effectively in the
contemporary global security arena. His recommendations
focus on the interagency arena and the military in general,
and the U.S. Army in particular. By airing this range of
geopolitical perspectives, the Strategic Studies Institute
hopes to contribute to the building of a new, 21st century
U.S. interagency and military strategy.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY

Global political violence is clashing with global economic
integration. More often than not, the causes and
consequences of the resultant instabilities tend to be
exploited by such destabilizers as rogue states, substate and
transnational political actors, insurgents, illegal drug
traffickers, organized criminals, warlords, ethnic cleansers,
militant fundamentalists, and 1,000 other “snakes with a
cause”—and the will to conduct terrorist and other
asymmetric warfare. The intent is to impose selfdetermined desires for “change” on a society, nation-state,
and/or other perceived symbols of power in the global
community—and, perhaps, revert to the questionable
glories of the 12th century.
In these conditions—exacerbated by the terrorist
attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, and by
the devastating U.S.-led attacks on Afghanistan
subsequently—the United States has little choice but to
reexamine and rethink national and global stability and
security—and a peaceful and more prosperous tomorrow.
To help civilian and military leaders analyze the
implications of the contemporary global security
environment, the author attempts several things. First, he
outlines the violent characteristics of the new security
arena. Second, he briefly examines the relationship of the
central strategic problems in the contemporary
environment—terrorism and governance. Third, he
describes the complex threat situation. Fourth, he presents
a basic outline for a reasoned multidimensional
political-economic stability capability- building response to
these problems. Finally, he enumerates some civil-military
implications for playing effectively in the global security
arena. His recommendations focus on implications for the
military in general and the U.S. Army in particular.
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NONSTATE ACTORS IN COLOMBIA:
THREAT AND RESPONSE

The terrorist attacks on New York City and Washington,
DC, on September 11, 2001, reminded Americans of
realities long understood in Europe, the Middle East,
Africa, Asia, and Latin America. That is, terrorism is a very
practical, calculated, and cynical strategy of warfare for the
weak to use against the strong. It is a generalized
political-psychological asymmetric substitute for
conventional military war. 1 The intent is to coerce
substantive political change.2
Now, for the first time since the end of the Cold War,
political and military leaders are rethinking the U.S. global
role and supporting strategies. They are now discussing
these issues in terms of the political and military transitions
required to deal more effectively with the global security
problems that were submerged in the morass of the
East-West conflict and unleashed by the Eastern European
revolutions of 1989. In these terms, Colombia is emerging as
the most compelling issue on the hemispheric agenda. That
country’s deeply rooted and ambiguous warfare has reached
crisis proportions in that Colombia’s “Hobbesian Trinity” of
illegal drug traffickers, insurgents, and paramilitary
organizations are creating a situation in which life is indeed
“nasty, brutish, and short.”3
The first step in developing a macro-level vision, policy,
and strategy to deal with the Colombian crisis in a global
context is to be clear on what the Colombian crisis is, and
what the fundamental threats implicit (and explicit) in it
are. Political and military leaders can start thinking about
the gravity of the terrorist strategy employed by Colombia’s
stateless adversaries from this point. It is also the point
from which leaders can begin developing responses
designed to secure Colombian, hemispheric, and global
stability. In this monograph, then, the author seeks to
1

explain the Colombian crisis in terms of nonstate threats to
the state and to the region—and appropriate strategic-level
responses.
The Context of the Colombian Crisis.
In the 1930s and 1940s, chronic political, economic, and
social problems created by a self-serving civilian oligarchy
began to bring about yet another crisis in a long list of
internal conflicts in Colombian history. In 1930, Liberal
reformists came to power and deprived Conservatives of the
control of the central government and extensive local
patronage. The Liberals also initiated an ambitious social
agenda that generated increasing civil violence between
Conservative and Liberal partisans.4
The catalyst that ignited the 18-year period called “the
violence” in April 1948 was the “assassination” of Liberal
populist, Jorge Eliecer Gaitan. That murder sparked a riot
known as the Bogotazo that left much of the capital
destroyed and an estimated 2,000 dead. Although the
government was able to contain the situation in Bogota, it
could not control the violence that spread through the
countryside. Rural violence became the norm as an
estimated 20,000 armed Liberal and Conservative
combatants settled old political scores. Over the period from
1948-66, la violencia claimed the lives of over 200,000
Colombians.5
The illegal drug industry began to grow and prosper in
this unstable environment of virtually uncontrolled
violence, rural poverty, political disarray, and government
weakness. That prosperity in turn provided resources that
allowed insurgent organizations to grow and expand. Later,
as the Colombian government proved less and less effective
in controlling the national territory and the people in it, the
self-defense paramilitary groups emerged.6 The thread that
permitted these violent nonstate actors to develop, grow,
and succeed was—and is—adequate freedom of movement
and action over time. The dynamics of the Hobbesian
2

Trinity, within the context of the almost constant instability
and violence over the past several decades, have
substantially expanded freedom of movement and action
and correspondingly eroded that of the state.7
Virtually anyone with any kind of resolve can take
advantage of the instability engendered by the ongoing
Colombian crisis. The tendency is that the best motivated
and best armed organization on the scene will eventually
control that instability for its own narrow purposes.
Colombia’s Three Wars.
The problem in Colombia is that this country and its
potential are deteriorating because of three ongoing,
simultaneous, and interrelated wars involving the illegal
drug industry; various insurgent organizations (primarily
the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia [FARC]); and
“vigilante” paramilitary groups (the United Self-Defense
Groups of Colombia [AUC]). This unholy trinity of nonstate
actors is perpetrating a level of corruption, criminality,
human horror, and internal (and external) instability
that—if left unchecked at the strategic level—can
ultimately threaten Colombia’s survival as an organized
democratic state and undermine the political stability and
sovereignty of its neighbors. In that connection, explicit
recognition now is that Colombia’s current situation has
reached crisis proportions. 8 The critical point of this
argument is that the substance, or essence, of the
Colombian crisis centers on the general organization,
activities, and threats of the major violent stateless actors
at work in that country.
The Narcos. The illegal drug industry in Colombia can be
described as a consortium that functions in much the same
way as virtually any multinational Fortune 500 company.
Products are made, sold, and shipped; bankers and financial
planners handle the monetary issues; and lawyers deal with
the legal problems.9 The consortium is organized to achieve
super efficiency and maximum profit. It has its “capos”
3

(chief executive officers and boards of directors), its
councils, system of justice, public affairs officers,
negotiators, project managers—and its enforcers. And, it
operates in virtually every country in the Western
Hemisphere and Europe.10
Additionally, the illegal drug industry has at its disposal
a very efficient organizational structure, the latest in
high-tech communications equipment and systems, and
state-of-the-art weaponry. With these advantages,
decisions are made quickly that can ignore or supersede
laws, regulations, decisions, and actions of most of the
governments of the nation-states in which the organization
operates. Narcos also have assassinated, bribed, corrupted,
intimidated, and terrorized government leaders, members
of the Congress, judges, law enforcement and military
officers, journalists, and even soccer players. As such, the
illegal drug industry is a major agent for destabilizing and
weakening the state governmental apparatus.
At the same time, narco cosmetic patronage to the poor,
creation of their own electoral machinery, participation
openly in traditional political parties, and financing of
friendly election campaigns have facilitated even greater
influence over the executive, legislative, and judicial
branches of Colombian government. That activity
exacerbates the necessity of meeting the narcos’ needs and
demonstrates the necessity of meeting their expectations
and demands. All this mitigates against responsible
government—and against any allegiance to the notion of
the public good and political equality. In that process, the
consortium has achieved a symbiotic relationship with the
state and, in a sense, is becoming a virtual super-state
within the state.11
The Insurgents. The FARC insurgents are essentially a
Marxist-Leninist foco (i.e., insurrectionary armed enclave)
in search of a mass base.12 Because of the general lack of
appeal to the Colombian population, the insurgents have
developed a military organization designed to achieve the
4

“armed colonization” of successive areas within the
Colombian national territory.13 The intent is to liberate and
mobilize the “disaffected and the dispossessed” population
into an alternative society.14 That is, FARC responded to the
lack of popular support, as did the communists in Vietnam,
by attempting to dominate the “human terrain.” In this
effort, FARC has proved every bit as ruthless as the Viet
Cong. Torture and assassination—to say nothing of
kidnapping, extortion, intimidation, and other terrorist
tactics—are so common as to go almost without comment
except in the most extreme cases. 15 Strategically,
operationally, and tactically, the FARC approach is the
Vietnamese approach.16
All this probably would have remained more or less out
of sight and out of mind of mainstream Colombia in the
underpopulated and underconsidered rural areas of the
country if it had not been for the financial support provided
by the illegal drug phenomenon. In 1982, a decision was
taken by the Seventh Conference of the FARC to develop
links with the Colombian drug industry that would provide
the money—and manpower—necessary for the creation of a
“true democracy.”17 As a result, FARC expanded from
approximately 2,000 guerrilla fighters in 1982 to over 70
fronts (company-sized units) with 18,000-20,000 fighters in
2001. This illicit funding has provided the FARC with the
capability of confronting regular Colombian military units
up to battalion size, and of overrunning police and military
installations and smaller units. Moreover, insurgent
presence has spread from 173 municipalities in 1985 to 622
in 1995, out of a total of approximately 1,050.18
Thus, Colombian insurgents have taken control of large
portions of the countryside and placed themselves in
positions from which to move into or dominate the major
population centers. The stated intent is to create an army of
30,000 with which to stage a “final offensive” against the
regular armed forces and “do away with the state as it now
exists in Colombia.”19 In these terms, through the control of
large parts of the Colombian national territory, the
5

insurgents are replacing the state. In that connection, the
insurgents are denying the state its traditional “monopoly
on violence,” and are challenging central government
authority over the other parts of the country still under
government control.
The Paramilitaries. The AUC self-defense organizations
are semi-autonomous regional alliances relatively
independent of each other. Nevertheless, a central
organization exists primarily to develop a national
coordinated strategy against the insurgents. Additionally,
the AUC national front organization provides guidance,
training, and other help to member organizations as
necessary. Strategy and tactics of the AUC, interestingly,
mirror those of the insurgents. They seek to expand their
control of grass-roots levels of government—municipalities
or townships (municipios) and rural areas (corregemientos),
and to exercise political influence through the control,
intimidation, or replacement of local officials. And, like the
insurgents, the paramilitaries profit from drug
trafficking.20
These “vigilante” groups began as self-defense
organizations for the protection of family, property, and the
law and order of a given geographical area. Because of the
AUC’s orientation against the insurgents and willingness to
provide fundamental justice and personal security to those
defined as “noncollaborators” with the insurgents, they
have consistently improved their standing in the Colombian
society. As examples, the number of small AUC groups have
increased from 273 to more than 400, with an estimated
current total of up to 8,000 active combatants. Moreover,
the paramilitaries have organized, trained, and equipped
“shock brigades” that since 1996 have become capable of
successfully challenging insurgent military formations.
Finally, in 2001 AUC groups are estimated to have an
armed presence in about 40 percent of the municipalities in
the country.21
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Despite paramilitary success against insurgents where
the state has been absent or ineffective and growing popular
support, the Colombian government has disavowed the
AUC. As such, the paramilitaries have become a third set of
competing nonstate actors—along with the various
in su rg en t org a ni zati ons and the i l l egal d r ug
consortium—challenging the authority of the state, and
claiming the right to control all or a part of the national
territory.
Conclusion. Each of the three armed nonstate players in
the Colombian crisis separately generates formidable
problems, challenges, and threats to the state and the
region in its own right. What, then, of an alliance of the
willing—even if that alliance represents a complicated
mosaic of mutual and conflicting interests?
The Narco-Insurgent-Paramilitary Nexus.
Within the past 3 or 4 decades, the nature of
insurgencies has changed dramatically throughout the
world with what Dr. Steven Metz calls “commercial
insurgency and the search for wealth.”22 One of the most
far-reaching transformations began in the 1970s with the
g rowin g in v olv ement of i ns ur gent f or c es wi th
narco-traffickers in the Middle East and Asia. Lebanon and
the Golden Triangle come quickly to mind.23 Thus, the
narco-insurgent connection is not new, and it is not confined
to Latin America. The question, then, is not whether there
might be an alliance between the illegal drug industry, the
insurgents, and the paramilitaries in Colombia. That has
been understood and admitted since the 1980s.24 The
question is whether the threats associated with that union
warrant real concern and a serious strategic response.
Mot ives an d Li nka ge s . The moti ves f or the
narco-insurgent-paramilitary alliance are straightforward.
They are accumulation of wealth, control of territory and
people, freedom of movement and action, and legitimacy.
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Together, these elements represent usable power—power to
allocate values and resources in a society.
The equation that links illegal narcotics trafficking to
insurgency and to the paramilitaries in Colombia—and
elsewhere—turns on a combination of need, organizational
infrastructure development, ability, and the availability of
sophisticated communications and weaponry. 25 For
example, the drug industry possesses cash and lines of
transportation and communication. Insurgent and
paramilitary organizations have followers, organization,
and discipline. Traffickers need these to help protect their
assets and project their power within and among
nationstates. Insurgents and paramilitaries are in constant
need of logistical and communications support—and
money.26
Together, the alliance has the economic and military
power equal to or better than that of most nation-states in
the world today. This alliance also has another advantage.
All three groups possess relatively flat organizational
structures and sophisticated communications systems that,
when combined, create a mechanism that is considerably
more effective and efficient than any slow-moving
bureaucratic and hierarchical governmental system. That
combined organizational advantage is a major source of
power in itself.27
Internal Objectives. The narco-insurgent-paramilitary
alliance is not simply individual or institutional
intimidation for financial or criminal gain. And it is not just
the use of insurgents and AUC groups as “hired guns” to
protect illegal drug cultivation, production, and trafficking.
Those are only business transactions. Rather, the long-term
objective of the alliance is to control or substantively change
the Colombian political system.28
Narcos ma y not s eek the over thr ow of the
government—as long as the government is weak and can be
controlled to allow maximum freedom of movement and
action.29 The insurgents, on the other hand, seek the
8

eventual destruction of the state as it exists. Whether or not
the insurgents are reformers or criminals is irrelevant.
Their avowed objective is to take direct control of the
government and the state.30 Likewise, the paramilitaries
want fundamental change. It appears that they are
interested in creating a strong state that is capable of
unquestioned enforcement of law and order. Whether or not
the vigilante groups are “democratic” or authoritarian is
also irrelevant. For their own self-preservation, they have
little choice but to take direct or indirect control of the
state. 31 The common narco-insurgent-paramilitary
governmental change or overthrow effort, therefore, is
directed at the political community and its institutions. In
this sense, the nexus is not simply criminal in nature. It is
more. It is a major political-psychological-moral-military
entity. At the same time, the countryside ceases to be a
simple theater for combat and becomes a setting for the
building of real local power.
The Latin American security dialogue does not generally
refer to the narco-insurgent-paramilitary nexus in terms of
their individual identities—at least in the sense of a
business organization striving to control the price of drugs,
weapons, or general protection. Rather, it tends to refer to
the whole entity as greater than the sum of its parts. The
security dialogue is concerned about a politicaleconomic-military force that has become a major national
and transnational nonstate actor. That actor threatens
national stability, development, and the future of the
democratic system not only in Colombia but in the entire
Western Hemisphere.32 To be sure, this is a loose and
dynamic merger subject to many vicissitudes, but the
“marriage of convenience” has lasted and appears to be
getting stronger.
External Objectives. The narco-insurgent-paramilitary
alliance appears to have developed a political agenda for
exerting leverage in the international as well as the
Colombian national arena. The perceived goal of a given
national agenda is to promote an “egalitarian social
9

rev olu tion ” th at wi l l op en up op p or tuni ti es f or
“everybody”—and give the organization the legitimate basis
for controlling some sort of nationalistic “narcocracy.” The
objectives of the international political agenda are to
establish acceptance, credibility, and legitimacy among the
sovereign states with which the general organization must
negotiate.33
In that connection, the spill-over effects of the illegal
drug and arms trafficking industry have inspired criminal
violence, corruption, and instability throughout Latin
America in general and Caribbean transit countries in
particular. For some time, the illegal drug industry has
operated back and forth across Colombia’s borders and
adjacent seas. Colombian insurgents and paramilitary
groups have also made frequent incursions into the
neighboring countries of Brazil, Ecuador, Panama, Peru,
and Venezuela. The resulting destabilization undermines
the security, well-being, and sovereignty of these
countries.34 A 1992 report by the West Indian Commission
captures the essence of the scope and gravity of this “equal
opportunity” phenomenon:
Nothing poses greater threats to civil society in [Caribbean]
countries than the drug problem, and nothing exemplifies the
powerlessness of regional governments more. That is the
magnitude of the damage that drug abuse and trafficking hold
for our Community. It is a many-layered danger. At base is the
human destruction implicit in drug addiction; but implicit also
is the corruption of individuals and systems by the sheer
enormity of the inducements of the illegal drug trade in
relatively poor societies. On top of all this lie the implications for
governance itself—at the hands of both external agencies
engaged in inter-national interdicting, and the drug barons
themselves—the “dons” of the modern Caribbean—who
threaten governance from within.35

Colombia is particularly important in this situation
because the narco-insurgent-paramilitary alliance
represents a dual threat to the authority of that
government—and to those of its hemispheric neighbors. It
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challenges the central governance of countries affected, and
it undermines the vital institutional pillars of regime
legitimacy and stability.36
The Internal and External Responses. Colombia, the
United States, and other countries that might ultimately be
affected by the destabilizing consequences of the
narco-insurgent-paramilitary nexus in Colombia have
tended to deal with the problem in a piecemeal fashion or
even ignore it. For 40 years the various Colombian
governments dealt with the problem on a completely ad hoc
basis—without a strategic-level plan, without adequate or
timely intelligence, without a consensus among the
political, economic, and military elites about how to deal
with the armed opposition, and, importantly, within an
environment of mutual enmity between the civil
government and the armed forces.37 With the promulgation
of Plan Colombia in 2000, there is at least the basis of a
coherent political project, but not much else.38
The United States has tended to ignore the insurgent
and paramilitary problems in Colombia—except for making
rhetorical statements regarding the peace process, terrorist
activities, and human rights violations. The United States
has focused its money, training, and attention almost
entirely on the counterdrug campaign. It has seen the
Colombian crisis in limited terms—the number of hectares
of coca eradicated, and the number of kilos of coca that have
been detected and destroyed. And, even though the United
States and Colombia have achieved a series of tactical
“successes” in the coca fields, the laboratories, and on the
streets, the violent nonstate actors remain strong and
become ever more wealthy. In the meantime, Colombia
continues to deteriorate and becomes ever more fragile.39
Finally, the other countries that are affected by the
nefarious activities of the narco-insurgent-paramilitary
nexus tend to be doing little more than watching, debating,
and wrangling about what—if anything—to do about the
seemingly new and unknown phenomenon. 40 As a
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consequence, positive political sovereignty, territory,
infrastructure, stability, and security are quietly and slowly
destroyed—and tens of thousands of innocents continue to
be displaced and die.
Conclusion. These are the realities of power operating in
the Colombian crisis. Several years ago, Abmael Guzman
reminded us that “Except for power, everything else is
illusion.”41
Where the Hobbesian Trinity Leads.
Nonstate criminal-terrorist organizations such as those
that constitute the Colombian narco-insurgentparamilitary nexus are significant political actors with the
ability to compromise the integrity and sovereignty of
individual nation-states. This is a fact that neither the
public policy nor the academic International Relations
communities have completely grasped. Many political and
military leaders see the violent nonstate actor as a low-level
law enforcement issue that does not require sustained
policy attention. Many academicians are accustomed to
thinking of nonstate actors as bit players on a local stage.
That may be the case in the early stages of their
development, but is certainly not the case in Colombia
today.42
Threats from the “Hobbesian Trinity” at work in
Colombia today come in many forms and in a matrix of
different kinds of challenges—varying in scope and scale. If
they have a single feature in common, however, it is that
they are systemic and well-calculated attempts to achieve
political ends.43 In that connection, we briefly explore two of
the many consequences the narco-insurgent-paramilitary
union has generated. First, we examine the erosion of
Colombian democracy; then we consider the erosion of the
state.
The Erosion of Colombian Democracy. The
policy-oriented definition of democracy that has been
12

generally accepted and used in U.S. foreign policy over the
past several years is probably best described as “procedural
democracy.” This definition tends to focus on the election of
civilian political leadership and—perhaps—on a relatively
high level of participation on the part of the electorate.
Thus, as long as a country is able to hold elections, it is still
considered a democracy—regardless of the level of
accountability, transparency, corruption, and ability to
extract and distribute resources for national development
and protection of human rights and liberties.44
In Colombia we observe important paradoxes. Elections
are held on a regular basis—but leaders, candidates, and
elected politicians are also regularly assassinated. As an
example, numerous governmental officials have been
assassinated following their election—138 mayors and 569
members of parliament, deputies, and city council members
were murdered between 1989 and 1999, along with 174
public officials in other positions. This is not to mention the
judiciary. In 1987 alone, 53 members of the judiciary were
assassinated.45 Additionally, intimidation, direct threats,
and the use of violence on a given person and his family play
an important role prior to elections. And, as a corollary, it is
important to note that, although the media is free from state
censorship, journalists and academicians who make their
opinions known through the press are systematically
assassinated.46
It is hard to credit Colombian elections as “democratic”
or “free.” Neither competition nor participation in elections
can be complete in an environment where armed and
unscrupulous nonstate actors compete violently to control
government—before and after elections. Moreover, it is
hard to credit Colombia as a democratic state as long as
elected leaders are subject to controls or vetoes imposed by
vicious nonstate actors. As a consequence, Ambassador
David Jordan argues that Colombia is an “anocratic
democracy.” That is, Colombia is a state that has the
procedural features of democracy, but retains the features
of an autocracy where the ruling elite faces no
13

accountability.47 Professor Eduardo Pizarro describes
Colombia as a “besieged democracy” and writes about the
“partial collapse” of the state.48 In either case, the actions of
the narco-insurgent-paramilitary alliance have pernicious
effects on democracy, and tend to erode the ability of the
state to carry out its legitimizing functions.
The Partial Collapse of the State. The Colombian state
has undergone severe erosion on two general levels. First,
the state’s presence and authority has physically
diminished over large geographical portions of the country.
Second, the idea of the partial collapse of the state is closely
related to the nonphysical erosion of democracy. Jordan
argues that corruption is key in this regard and is a prime
mover toward “narcosocialism.”49
In the first instance, the notion of “partial collapse”
refers to the fact that there is an absence or only partial
presence of state institutions in over 60 percent of the rural
municipalities of the country. Also, even in those areas that
are not under the direct control of narco, insurgent, or
paramilitary organizations, institutions responsible for
protecting citizens—notably, the police and judiciary—have
eroded to the point where they are unable to carry out their
basic individual and collective security functions. Indicators
of this problem can be seen in two statistics. First, the
murder rate in Colombia is the highest per capita in the
world at 41,564 in 1999.50 Second, the proportion of
homicides that end with a conviction is less than 4 percent.51
These alarming indicators of impunity strongly confirm
that the state is not exercising adequate control of its
territory or people.
In the second instance, nonphysical erosion of the state
centers on the widespread and deeply entrenched issue of
corruption. As an example, in 1993 and 1994 the U.S.
Government alluded to the fact that former-President
Ernesto Samper had received money from narcotics
traffickers. Later, in 1996, based on that information, the
United States withdrew Samper’s visa and decertified
14

Colombia for not cooperating in combating illegal drug
trafficking. Subsequently, the Colombian Congress
absolved Samper of all drug charges by a vote of 111-43.52
Not surprisingly, another indicator of government
corruption at the highest levels is found in the Colombian
Congress. The Senate decriminalized the issue of “illicit
enrichment” by making it a misdemeanor that could be
prosecuted only after the commission of a felony. 53
Moreover, a former U.S. Ambassador to Colombia
asserted—in public and without fear of contradiction—that
about 70 percent of the Colombian Congress “is bent.”54
Clearly, the reality of corruption in government favoring the
illegal drug industry in Colombia is inimical to the public
good.
Finally, contemporary nontraditional conflict with
nonstate actors is not a kind of appendage—a lesser or
limited thing—to the more comfortable military-to-military
paradigm. It is a great deal more. As long as opposition
exists that is willing to risk all to take down violently a
government and establish its own—or a surrogate—there is
war. This is a zero-sum game in which there is only one
winner. It is thus, total. In The Constant Gardner, John
LeCarre vividly captures the political implications of the
type of nonstate threats that must be confronted today. He
outlines the answer to the question of “When is a state not a
state?” from the point of view of a common sense
practitioner:
I would suggest to you that, these days, very roughly, the
qualifications for being a civilized state amount to—electoral
suffrage, ah—protection of life and property—um, justice,
health and education for all, at least to a certain level—then
the maintenance of a sound administrative infrastructure—and roads, transport, drains, et cetera—and—
what else is there?—ah yes, the equitable collection of taxes. If
a state fails to deliver on at least a quorum of the above—then
one has to say the contract between state and citizen begins to
look pretty shaky—and if it fails on all of the above, then it’s a
failed state, as we say these days.55
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Non state a cto r s usi ng as ymmetr i c ter r or i s t
political-psychological strategies are pervasive in the world
today. The general threat(s) to regime stability and
ex isten ce g en erated by the Col ombi an nar c oinsurgent-paramilitary nexus is only one case in point. In
light of the dynamics of violent stateless actors, there is
ample reason for worldwide concern—and action.
Where To from Here?
In the post-Cold War era, the dominant threats to
Colombia, the Western Hemisphere, and most of the rest of
the world are manifested in nontraditional ways. The most
acute national security challenges are transnational
threats that emanate from violent nonstate actors. If not
confronted effectively, they can corrupt and subvert the
very fabric of society and the fundamental institutions of
law and order. This type of conflict now involves entire civil
populations—not just “enemy” military formations. This
type of conflict also involves the relative ability of the
parties to a conflict such as that in Colombia to shift the
proverbial “hearts and minds”—and support—of the people
in their respective favor. Finally, this type of conflict
demands a coherent and multidimensional politicalpsychological, socio-economic, and military police-people
oriented response.
Toward a Populace Oriented Model. Sun Tzu warned
that, “In War, numbers alone confer no advantage. Do not
advance relying on sheer military power.”56 None other than
Clausewitz points out that, in the type of conflict taking
place in Colombia, there are two nontraditional centers of
gravity (i.e., the hub of all power and movement upon which
everything depends). They are public opinion and the
leadership that organizes and directs that opinion.57 In that
context, the dynamic competition for the allegiance of the
people demands a multidimensional model. Such a model
would depict the activities and efforts of the various political
actors involved in their attempts to achieve their strategic
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vision and ultimate political objectives. It would portray the
allegiance of a people as the primary center of gravity.
The balance of persuasive and coercive attempts to
bring “hearts and minds” to one player or another will
determine success or failure. In these terms, the
government and its external allies can coerce, persuade,
and demonstrate the populace into supportive actions on
their own behalf. Internal illegal adversaries and their
allies can do the same thing. This is a dangerous
“double-edged sword.” Thus, a targeted government must
attack these “new” centers of gravity, while at the same time
protecting its own corresponding centers of gravity.
Importantly, the public opinion center of gravity is likely to
be the same for all parties to the conflict. It is in this dialectic
that only one victor can possibly emerge.58
Even though every internal conflict, such as that in
Colombia, is situation specific, it is not completely unique.
Throughout the universe of intranational war cases, there
are analytical commonalities. Three broadly inclusive
elements contribute most directly to the allegiance of the
populace and the achievement of a given end-state. The
essential foundational elements for a targeted government
are postulated as clusters of closely related political,
economic, social, and security activities that must be
performed at the strategic/macro level. There is very little
glamour, excitement, and sound-bite material in much of
the work outlined below. But these basic elements are the
proven keys to a stable, peaceful, and prosperous world.
They are: (1) establishing security, (2) capability building,
and (3) nurturing legitimate governance.59
Establishing Security. A fundamental societal
requirement is for its government to provide security—that
is, “to insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common
defense . . .”60 It begins with the provision of personal
security to individual members of the society. It extends to
protection from violent internal (including criminals) and
external enemies—and perhaps from repressive internal
17

institutions (e.g., the military, police, and self-appointed
vigilante groups). The security problem ends with the
establishment of firm but fair control over the entire
national territory.
Strategic planners must understand that once an illegal
internal enemy—such as Colombia’s “Hobbesian Trinity” of
insurgents, narco-barons, and “paramilitary” vigilante
groups—becomes firmly established, reform and
development efforts are insufficient to deal with the entire
security problem. The illegal violent adversaries will finally
be defeated only by a superior organization and a
political-military strategy designed to neutralize or
eliminate it. The sum of the parts of a desired countereffort
to deal with a major internal security threat requires not
only a certain political competence to coordinate a
wide-scale political-economic-psychological-military
security effort, but also to exert effective, discrete, and
deadly force.61 It must be remembered, too, that for ultimate
effectiveness, political and security forces must also be able
to deal with the illegal nonstate opposition on the basis of
the rule of law.62
In addition to the need to establish and maintain the rule
of law, personal and collective freedom from intimidation
and violence (i.e., providing security) includes two other
elements. First is a need to politically, psychologically,
economically, and militarily isolate the warring political
and criminal factions from all sources of internal and
external support. Second, security implicitly requires
sustaining life, relieving suffering, and regenerating a
distressed economy. At base, however, enforcing and
maintaining the rule of law takes us back to where we
began—to whatever it takes to establish and maintain the
effective control of the national territory and the people in
it.63
Capability Building for Sustainable Development and
Peace. Another societal requirement for popular support to
government and the state is that of political, economic, and
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social development. The reasons are straightforward. This
is the basis for internal strengthening of the state and for
demonstrating that government is, in fact, responsive to the
needs of the people. Such a system is inherently “just” and
stable. Experience shows that the level of a regime’s ability
to fairly and effectively collect and allocate resources for
personal security and sustainable development is a
significant measure of legitimate governance.64
The international security dialogue focuses on the
problem of national economic development. Underdevelopment and resultant individual and collective
poverty are being recognized as the world’s most
ov erwh elmin g thr eats . On the p os i ti ve s i d e of
capability-building for sustainable development, the term
implies the development of political competence that can
and will manage the development of the national economy
honestly and effectively. On the negative side of this
problem, ignoring the political competence variable within
the context of a socio-economic development program
implies all of the instabilities and threats associated with
illegal nonstate corrosion of the fabric of society.65
In the past, it was expected that stimulation of the
economy would automatically lead to societal stability and
political development in the long term. Somehow,
stimulation of the economy was also expected to improve
economic disparities, equity, and justice. That has not
happened. Experience demonstrates that in order to
generate a viable political competence that can and will
manage, coordinate, and sustain security and economic
development, it is necessary to accomplish three additional
goals: to eliminate (or at least control) corruption; foster
political consent on the part of the various components of
the national population; and establish and maintain
popularly accepted peaceful societal conflict resolution
processes. With these building blocks in place, a legitimate
civil society and sustainable peace become real
possibilities.66
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Nurturing a Civil Society and Legitimate Governance.
Finally, in nurturing a sustainable civil society and a
durable internal peace, it is also necessary to develop the
aggressive unified political-diplomatic, socio-economic,
psychological-moral, and military-police engagement in
society that can and will deal effectively with the
multidimensional root causes that brought on the
instability and violence in Colombia in the first place. The
intent and requirement is to eliminate the corruption and
generate the societal acceptance and support that
governing institutions need to adequately and fairly
manage internal governance—and to guarantee individual
and collective well-being.
Generally, this requires a concerted anticorruption and
public diplomacy effort. It is important to remember that no
policy, no strategy, and no internal or foreign engagement
can be sustained for any length of time without at least the
tacit support of the people involved. The hard evidence over
time from around the world demonstrates the absolute
necessity of protecting one’s own center of gravity while
taking the offensive against that of an adversary.
This takes us directly to the issue of legitimate
governance. No group or force can legislate or decree
legitimacy for itself. It must develop, sustain, and enhance
moral legitimacy by its actions over time. Legitimization
and internal stability derive from popular and institutional
perceptions that authority is genuine and effective, and
uses morally correct means for reasonable and fair
purposes. The wisdom of Sun Tzu is, again, relevant. He
argues that, “Those who excel in war first cultivate their
own humanity and justice and maintain their laws and
institutions. By these means they make their governments
invincible.”67 The implication is clear—a decision that the
political, psychological, economic, and security actions
necessary to address this societal requirement are “too
hard” will result in a final decision for failure.
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Conclusions. Implementing the recommended
extraordinary challenges of reform and regeneration
outlined above will not be easy. That will, however, be far
less demanding and costly in political, economic, social, and
military terms than allowing the causes of the conflict to
continue to be exploited by Colombia’s Hobbesian
Trinity—and to continue to foster the crises that can lead to
the detriment and ultimate failure of the state.
Implications for the Military: Two Keys to Planning
and Implementing Strategic Clarity—and Success.
The common denominator of the security dialogue in
Colombia and the Western Hemisphere is the underlying
issue of national, regional, and international instability.
Solutions to the instability exploited by Colombia’s violent
Hobbesian Trinity of nonstate actors are based on the
fundamental requirement that the armed forces, police, and
civilian elements of society develop a working relationship
that will facilitate the achievement of legitimate national
security.
The accomplishment of this most formidable task within
the context of illegal insurgent, narco-trafficker, and
paramilitary violence requires two fundamental strategic
efforts. The first involves the political, coalitional, and
multiorganizational partnership requirements that
mandate doctrinal and organizational change for strategic
clarity and greater effectiveness in any conflict situation.
This in turn depends on a second effort: the development of
professional civil-military leadership that will ensure not
just unity of military command, but unity of civil-military
effort.68 Both these efforts demand a carefully staffed,
phased, and long-term validation, planning, and
implementation program. The recommended basic
direction for these efforts is outlined as follows.
Partnership Requirements. The United States is not the
only political actor in the global security arena, and it is not
the only player in more specific smaller-scale contingency or
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stability operations. At the same time, the U.S. military is
not the only actor in any kind of U.S. involvement in the
global security environment. A bewildering array of U.S.
civilian agencies, international organizations, and
nongovernmental organizations, as well as coalition and
h ost cou n try g over nment c i vi l i an and mi l i tar y
organizations, respond to complex emergencies such as that
in Colombia. For any degree of success in “going beyond
declaring victory and going home” and actually providing
the foundations of a sustainable peace, involvement must be
understood as a holistic process that relies on various U.S.,
host country, international organization, and other civilian
and military agencies and institutions working together in
an integrated fashion. The creation of that unity of effort to
gain ultimate success must be addressed at different levels.
At the highest level, the primary parties to a given
conflict must be in general agreement with regard to the
objectives of a political vision and the associated set of
operations. And, although such an agreement regarding a
strategic or operational end-state is a necessary condition
for effective partnership, it is not sufficient. Sufficiency and
clarity are achieved by adding appropriate policy
implementation and military management structure—and
“mind-set adjustments”—at the following three additional
levels.
The next level of effort requires an executive-level
management structure that can and will ensure continuous
cooperative planning and execution of policy among and
between the relevant U.S. civilian and military agencies
(i.e., vertical coordination). That structure must also ensure
that all political-military action at the operational and
tactical levels directly contributes to the achievement of the
mutually agreed strategic political end-state. This
requirement reflects a need to improve coordination within
the operational theater, and between the theater
commander and Washington.69
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Third, steps must be taken to ensure clarity, unity, and
effectiv en ess by i ntegr ati ng c oal i ti on mi l i tar y,
international organization, and nongovernmental
organization processes with U.S. political-military
planning and implementing processes (i.e., horizontal
coordination). It has become quite clear that the political
end-state is elusive, and operations suffer when there is no
strategic planning structure empowered to integrate the
key multinational and multiorganizational civil-military
elements of a given operation. It is also clear that
duplication of effort, and other immediate consequences of
the absence of such a strategic planning body, is costly in
political, personnel, and financial terms. The lessons have
been demonstrated over and over again in such diverse
cases as the relatively recent natural disaster hurricane
relief operation in Central America (i.e., Hurricane Mitch),
and the various man-made disaster relief operations in the
former Yugoslavia, Somalia, and Afghanistan.70
At a base level, however, unity of effort requires
education as well as organizational solutions. Even with an
adequate planning and organizational structure,
ambiguity, confusion, and tensions are likely to emerge.
Only when and if the various civilian and military leaders
involved in an operation can develop the judgment and
empathy necessary to work cooperatively and collegially
will they be able to plan and conduct the operations that
meet the needs of the host nation, and use the appropriate
capabilities of the U.S. interagency community,
in tern a tion a l or gani zati ons , nongover nmental
organizations, and coalition/partner military forces.
Effective partnership ultimately entails the type of
professional civilian and military education and leader
development that results in effective diplomacy, as well as
to professional competence.71
Leader Development and Professionalization. Until
civilian and military leaders learn to think and act
strategically and cooperatively within the global security
environment, the United States and the rest of the global
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community face unattractive alternatives. They can either
leave forces in place to maintain a de facto military
occupation, as in Cyprus, or they can depart the scene with
the sure knowledge that a given conflict will erupt again and
again, as in Rwanda. As in the later case, the time, treasure,
and blood expended will have been for nothing. At a
minimum, there are five educational and cultural
imperatives to modify Cold War and ethno-centric
mind-sets, and to develop the leader judgment needed to
deal effectively with complex, politically dominated,
multidimensional, multiorganizational, multinational, and
multicultural contingencies.72
First is the need to attune military and police minds to
cope with the many ways that political and psychological
considerations affect the use—and nonuse—of force. Second
is a requirement to attune military, police, and civilian
minds to understand that the number of battlefield victories
or the number of “enemies” arrested or killed only has
meaning to the extent that such achievements contribute
directly to the legitimate strengthening of the state. Third is
a need to teach military, police, and civilian participants in
“our savage wars of peace” how to communicate and deal
with a diversity of civil-military cultures. Fourth is a
requirement to teach military and civilian officials at all
levels how to cooperatively plan and implement
interagency, international organization, nongovernmental
organization, and coalition/partnership civil-military
operations. Finally and importantly, nonstate actors in an
unstable situation such as that in Colombia are likely to
have at their disposal an awesome array of conventional
and unconventional weaponry. Thus, education and
training programs for peace-enforcement and stability
operations must prepare soldiers to be effective
warfighters.73
The professionalization and leader development
imperatives listed above provide the bases of the
understanding and judgment that civilian and military
leaders must have to be successful in a contemporary
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conflict like that in Colombia. The ultimate requirement is
to generate and encourage a thinking process and an
understanding of grand strategy that will allow one to be
clear on what the situation in Colombia is and what it is not.
The hard evidence over time underscores the wisdom of
Clausewitz’s dictum, “The first, the supreme, the most far
reaching act of judgment that the statesman and the
commander have to make is to establish the kind of war on
which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor
trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature.”74
A Cautionary Note. To dismiss the above strategic-level
recommendations for civilian and military leadership
development and professionalization as “too difficult,”
“unrealistic in the midst of war,” or “simply impossible” is to
accept the inevitability of defeat. Are there any examples in
history? A relatively recent and positive example is that of
El Salvador in its struggle against the externally supported
violent nonstate Farabundo Marti National Liberation
Front (FMLN) actors. Although that effort did not achieve
the ideal, from 1979 to 1989, “Salvadorans successfully
expanded what was essentially a twelve thousand-strong
‘Praetorian Guard’ . . . into a sixty thousand-strong fighting
force . . .”75
Conclusions. The lessons from a half-century of bitter
experience suffered by governments involved in dealing
with internal instabilities and nonstate actors show that a
given international intervention often ends short of
achieving the mandated peace. Military efforts at the
tactical and operational levels—no matter how well
conducted—are insufficient to deal with the entire task. Too
often, this is because short-, mid-, and long-term strategic
political-military objectives are unclear, the “end-game” is
undefined, consistent and appropriate support is not
provided, and civil-military unity of purpose remains
unachieved. Thus, it is imperative to develop leaders and
organizational structures that can generate strategic
clarity and make it work. The sooner, the better.
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Afterword.
Even though every internal conflict is situation specific,
it is not completely unique. Throughout the universe of
in tran ation a l war c ases , ther e ar e anal yti c al
commonalities. The evidence clearly indicates that once
security and the rule of law are firmly established,
legitimate governance ultimately defeats a violent nonstate
actor by removing the motives that created that adversary
in the first place.
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